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"In such case the bond, although the remedy thereon be barred by the statute, may be given in evidence,
as the inducement to, or explanatory of and as furnishing the legal basis of the express promise to pay the
amount remaining due on the bond. Leonard, admr.
v. Hughlett, 41 Md. 380; St. Mark's Church v. Miller,

99 Md. 26. 121

Thus it is that the two statutes have been treated differently by the courts. As to simple contracts, judicial
construction of the limitation statutes has been less strict
than in the case of specialties. The reason therefor can
be found by comparing the wording of the statutes in each
case, for while the statute as to simple contracts merely
states that "all actions ...shall be commenced or sued...
within three years", the statute relating to specialties provides that "No... specialty. . . shall be good and pleadable
... after ... the thing in action [is] above twelve years
standing". As a result the Courts have long considered
themselves free to engraft exceptions upon the limitation
statute pertaining to simple contracts where justice so requires while no such freedom is exercised in the case of
specialties. As to the latter, the Maryland judiciary has
left the task of removing an injustice, actual or threatened,
to the legislative branch of the government. And the
State's legislative history makes it apparent that the legislature has been quick to act in such case.

AVIATOR'S RIGHTS IN AIRSPACE
United States v. Causby1
The United States leased an airport approximately
one-half mile from respondents' chicken farm near Greensboro, North Carolina. Continuous flights of Army and
Navy planes in landing and taking off rendered respondents' land unfit for a chicken farm, and they brought suit
alleging that their property had been taken by the Federal
Government without compensation. The Court of Claims
held that an easement had been taken and made an award
of two thousand dollars to respondents. 2 On certorari (two
justices dissenting) the Supreme Court agreed that a
" 106 Md. 693, 706, 68 A. 294, 296 (1907).
166 S. Ct. 1062 (U. S. 1946).
,60 F. Supp. 751 (1945).
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servitude had been imposed upon the land. However, since
the Court of Claims failed to make certain essential findings as to the nature of the easement, the Supreme Court
was unable to determine the correctness of the amount of
the award, and so reversed and remanded to the Court of
Claims for further determination of the exact amount of
damages.
This decision brings to the fore those several theories
as to airspace ownership which have so often plagued the
courts in the past. Three of these, the ad coelum, the zone,
and the easement theories, may be catalogued as being
beneficial to the protection of the landowner's rights
against trespasses by the aviator; the fourth and last, the
nuisance theory, favors the aviator against the landowner.
The ad coelum theory, a product of the common law,
conferred the greatest possible rights on the landowner. It
gave him the sole right to all the airspace above his land,
and made any invasions of this airspace an actionable trespass.3 Such a rule, making trespassers of all who flew over
land other than their own, had to be modified upon the
advent of aviation as a factor in our civilization.
One modification of the above was an attempt to adjust
the conflicting interests of the landowner and the aviator
by dividing the airspace into zones or strata. This zone
theory limits the owner's rights in the airspace to as much
of that space as he can possibly make use of, or needs, for
the fullest enjoyment of his land.' The landowner is considered as having exclusive possessory rights to the lower
zone, and any intrusion is regarded as an invasion of his
property, subjecting the intruder to suit for trespass. The
upper zone, however, is regarded as being beyond the
scope of agrarian ownership. The aviator may use it freely
provided he does not unreasonably interfere with the quiet
enjoyment of the surface area. Such unreasonable interferences will give the landowner the right to bring an
action for nuisance, 5 trespass being limited to invasions of
an area effectively possessed.
;Herrin v. Sutherland, 74 Mont. 587, 241 Pac. 328 (1925), shooting at
birds; Whittaker v. Stangwick, 100 Minn. 386, 111 N. W. 295 (1907), where
ducks shot across land fell on said laid; Portsmouth Harbor L. & H. Co. v.
United States, 260 U. S. 327, 67 L. Ed. 287, 43 S. Ct. 135 (1922) ; Hannabalson v. Sessions, 116 Iowa 457, 90 N. W. 93 (1902), thrusting an arm across
a neighbors property in an angry manner.
4 Burnham v. Beverly Airways, 311 Mass. 628, 42 N. E. 2d 575 (1942).
5 Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corporation, 41 F. 2d 929, U. S. Av. R. 21
(N. D. Ohio 1930), modified on appeal, 55 F. 2d 201, 83 A. L. R. 319, U. S.
Av. R. 1 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932); Cory v. Physical Culture Hotel, 14 Fed.
Supp. 977 (W. D. N. Y. 1936) ; aff'd. 88 F. 2d 411 (C. C. A. 2d 1937).
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The third of the pro-landowner theories is the theory of
airspace ownership subject to a public right of avigation 8
It attempts to reconcile the claims of the landowner and
the aviator to the airspace by recognizing the landowner's
unlimited ownership of upward space, but at the same time
subjecting his upward ownership to a public right of avigation, "at a reasonable height and in a reasonable manner. "' 7
This, in effect, gives the aviator an easement in the airspace, but when he makes use of the easement granted he
is required to do it at such an altitude and in such a
manner as not to interfere with the landowner's use of
the land. If he flies so low as to interfere, the landowner
is not limited to a suit in nuisance, but may bring the
possessory action of trespass against him, since the
theory recognizes the landowner's unlimited possession of
the upward space. The easement granted to use this space
is automatically revoked when the aviator abuses his
privilege by low flights, thereby allowing trespass to lie.'
Contradistinguished from the three theories advocated
by the landowner groups, the air interests of this country
feel that questions as to air rights should be decided by
the application of the nuisance theory. It does not regard
mere entries in the superincumbent airspace as trespasses,
unless such entries cause actual harm or damage to the
landowner. Low flights which do not touch the ground,
or some structure thereon, are recognized only as nuisances, and the landowner cannot bring trespass for such
low flights unless he can prove an actual touching. This
theory denies any ownership at all in the airspace save
where actual use thereof is being made by the landowner.
It is admitted that the landowner has a prior right of occupancy wherever he is making present use of the space
above his land. 9 This theory does not afford enough protection to the landowner, and is at odds with the law as
interpreted by those courts holding that invasions of the
airspace column at low altitudes are actionable trespasses. 10
In the present case, the United States unsuccessfully
attempted to argue the nuisance theory in it's behalf. It's
contention was that the Air Commerce Act of 192611 as
6 RESTATEMENT,

TORTS, Sec. 159, 194.

Ibid. See. 194, comment g.
8Guith v. Consumers Power Co., 36 Fed. 2d 21 (D. Mich. 1940).
§ Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, 88 Fed. 2d 755 U. S. Av. R. 1 (C. C. A.
9th 1936), cert. den. 300 U. S. 654, 57 S. Ct. 431, 81 L. Ed. 865 (1937).
10 Supra, ns. 3, 4, 7.
1149 U. S. C. (1934) Sec. 171.
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amended by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 193812 should be
interpreted along the lines of the nuisance theory. The
Civil Aeronautics Authority had defined navigable airspace as "airspace above the minimum safe altitudes of
flight", 13 and flights above this minimum safe altitude were
exempt from suit except in nuisance. The government
was contending that all the airspace needed for taking off
and landing was above the minimum safe altitudes of
flight and so such airspace was subject to a public right
of flight therein.
The Supreme Court pointed out the hiatus in the logic
of the petitioners when it distinguished between the thirty
to one safe glide angle,a which was simply approved by
the C. A. A. as the safe way to land and take off, and the
navigable airspace which Congress placed in the public
domain. 4 The Court said that the flight of planes skimming the earth though not touching it, was as much an appropriation of the use of the land as a more conventional
entry upon it. The intrusion here was so immediate as to
subtract substantially from the owner's full enjoyment of
the property, making the use of this property quite
limited. ".... the landowner, as an incident to his ownership, has a claim to it [this airspace] and... invasions of
it are in the same category as invasions of the surface."'15
In it's conclusion, the Court indicated that normally the
inconvenience of planes flying over land is not compensible. "The airspace, apart from the immediate reaches
above the land, is part of the public domain."' 16 The Court
did not determine in this case just how far upward these
"reaches" extend. However, the implication that can be
drawn from the decision is that since the thirty to one safe
glide angle approved by the C. A. A. passed over respondents' property at eighty-three feet, the "reaches" end somewhere between eighty-three and 500 feet in the daytime,
and between eighty-three and 1000 feet at night.'7 Flights
12 Ibid, Sec. 401.

8Ibid, Sec. 180.

A 30 to 1 glide angle means one foot of elevation or descent for every
30 feet of horizontal distance.
11 Supra, n. 13.
1566 S. Ct. 1062, 1068 (1946). See also Bouve, Private Ownership of
Navigable Airspace under the Commerce Clause, 21 Amer. Bar Assoc.
Journ. 416, 421-422 1935; Hise, Ownership and Sovereignty of the Air or
Air Space above Landowner's Premises with Special Reference to Aviation,
16 Ia. L. Rev. 169 (1931) ; Eubank, The Doctrine of the Airspace Zone of
Effective Possession, 12 Boston Univ. L. Rev. 414 (1932).
16 66 S. Ct. 1062, 1068 (U. S. 1946).
17 The minimum prescribed by the authority is 500 feet during the day
and 1000 feet at night for air carriers, (Civil Air Regulations, Pt. 61, Code
Fed. Reg. Cum. Supp., Tit. 14, ch. 1, Sees. 61.7400, 61.7401) and from 300
13
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over private lands were not considered by the Court to
constitute a taking unless they were so low or so frequent
as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment of the land, but such flights would be considered
as trespasses if below 500 feet in daytime, or 1000 feet at
night.
Now let us turn to one of the more pressing legal problems at hand today-the protection of airport approaches
from dangerous obstructions. With the increased size and
numbers of planes, the need arises either for larger airports, or the further removal of structures and obstructions
which surround these airports. Generally speaking, it
would be financially prohibitive to purchase all the additional land needed, and a solution has been sought in the
exercise of the police power to control the height of structures on property adjoining airports. Such control has
generally been effected through zoning legislation and
regulations.
Maryland has had one case 8 in which the validity of a
state zoning statute was questioned. The statute under
attack read in part:
"the height of buildings and/or other structures is
hereby regulated and restricted within a distance of
five thousand feet from any such public Airport or
land (sic.) Field measured at a right angle from any
side or in a radial line from any corner of the established boundary line thereof in any and all directions
as follows:
No building or structure may be erected whose
height exceeds one-fifteenth the shortest distance from
the nearest side of said building or structure to the
nearest established perimeter as distinguished from
boundary line of such public Airport or Landing
Field."' 9
This statute limited the plaintiff very drastically as to
the height of any buildings he could erect on his land. The
Court announced that under this statute the plaintiff would
be able to erect a building only six and two-thirds feet
high at a distance of 100 feet from the perimeter of the
to 1000 feet for other aircraft depending on the type of plane and the
character of the terrain. Id., Pt. 60, Fed. Cum. Supp., Tit. 14, ch. 1, Sees.
60.350-60.3505.
18 Mutual Chemical Co. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, Circuit
Court of Baltimore City, Daily Record, Jan. 27, 1939, U. S. Av. R. 11,
(1939), noted in 10 Air L. Rev. 312 (1939), 10 J. Air L. 424 (1939).
29 Md. Code (1939) Art. 1A, Sec. 59.
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airport, and one only thirty-three feet high at 500 feet
from the perimeter. The Court felt that such prohibitions
were confiscatory since they prevented a reasonable use
of the plaintiff's land. It went on to say that this act purported to be a zoning regulation, and that it did not contain any provisions for the condemnation of unimproved
property, or of the rights the owners may have to erect
new buildings or structures above the limits of the act.
The effect of the act was to confiscate the property of the
plaintiff, and this, the Court said, must be done by condemnation proceedings. The Court stressed the fact that
municipalities and counties of the state were given the
power of exercising the right of eminent domain for the
acquisition of property for airports. 20 The Court held that
the proper method of acquiring the right to the exclusive
use of the airspace at and near the boundaries of public
airports would be either by purchase or condemnation of
the surface of the land beneath the required airspace, or
by purchase or condemnation of the right of the owner of
the surface to erect buildings thereon beyond some designated height.
This particular airport zoning regulation was too strict
and limiting in it's scope to be valid. It was thus not a
proper use of the police power. The fact, however, that
this one regulation was invalid does not appear to be the
basis for any claim that all airport zoning is unsound.
Other state courts have held that the limiting of the height
of structures which can be erected near airports, through
21
zoning legislation, is a valid exercise of the police power.
This brings us to a consideration of the constitutionality
of the latest Maryland Zoning Statute 21 which was obviously enacted with an eye to revising and moderating the type
of legislation struck down by the Mutual Chemical Co.
case just noted.2 3 Under this 1944 statute political subdivisions of the state are, in general, authorized to adopt,
revise, administer and enforce reasonable airport zoning
regulations under the police power. There is set up a
Board of Appeals in each subdivision which can issue
variances from the zoning regulations adopted where the
case is one of practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship.
20

Ibid, Secs. 35, 3.

21 Supra, n. 4, where by dictum the Court said: .

it should be remembered, however, that the statute in 40A-401 now contains adequate provisions for securing and regulating the approach to public airports.";
United States v. 357.25 Acres of Land, 235 C. C. H. sec. 1883 (W. D. La.
1944).
::Md. Laws 1944 (Sp. Sess.) Ch. 13.
Supra, n. 18.

306

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. VIII

Any person desiring to erect any structure or increase the
height of an existing structure in violation of any enacted
zoning regulations may apply to this Board for a variance.
There is further provided adequate judicial review, by a
court of record, of any contested decision of the Board of
Appeals. The court of record may affirm, modify, or reverse the Board, and appeal from the decision of the court
of record to the Court of Appeals of Maryland is also al24
lowed. We find in this statute an ameliorating section
which reads:
"In any case in which: ... (d) any zoning regulation or any order, requirement, decision or determination issued or made by an authority having the power
to do so interferes with the use or enjoyment of private
property, or otherwise infringes upon private property
rights to such an extent that it would be a taking of
private property without just compensation under the
provisions of the Constitution of the United States or
the Constitution of Maryland, the political subdivision
owning, controlling or operating the particular airport
affected may acquire by purchase, grant, lease, or condemnation in the manner set forth in Article 33A...
or in the manner provided'by law under which such
political subdivision may be empowered to acquire
property for public purposes, other than street purposes, such as air right, easement or other right, title
or interest in property as may be necessary or proper
to eliminate the airport hazard or to protect the said
aerial approaches..."
It would seem that this statute would survive an attack
on it's constitutionality similar to that directed at the 1939
statute in the Mutual Chemical Co. case. 2' The presence of
adequate judicial review, and the recognition of the need
for condemnation proceedings in certain cases are both
conscious attempts to meet the objections raised to the 1939
statute. The factor, too, of the granting of variances is to
be noted as official recognition of the fact that some regulations might well be too restrictive on certain landowners,
and that they should be relaxed in deserving cases and
within certain bounds. All of these elements were missing
in the 1939 statute.
The present decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States raises grave doubts as to the constitutionality
2,

Supra, n. 22, Ch. 13, Sec. 65.
n. I&
Supra,
F1

19441

SCHOLTES v. McCOLGAN

of those zoning regulations in which the primary purpose
is to acquire a public easement of avigation in the "lower
reaches" of the airspace for the taking off and landing of
planes, without the payment of just compensation to the
private landowners adjacent to such airports. Furthermore it supports the position taken by the Baltimore City
Court, that the exercise of the power of eminent domain
and not the police power is the proper procedure for acquiring adjacent air space rights for the taking off and
landing of planes.

RESTRICTIONS AGAINST OCCUPANCY-EXISTENCE
OF A GENERAL PLAN
Scholtes v. McColgan'
Appellant brought suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County to restrain the appellee from selling a dwelling or any part of a tract of land to any person of the Negro
race or from permitting any person of the Negro race to
occupy it; an order dismissing the bill of complaint was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Although some contradictory evidence was presented
at the trial, the Court considered the following facts as
substantially correct: The appellant purchased two lots
from the appellee, the first in 1940, the second in 1942.
Both deeds contained a clause restricting occupation of
the property "by any Negro or any person of Negro extraction", except in the capacity of a domestic servant. The
lots purchased by the appellant were part of a tract of
about 74 acres located on Falls Road in Baltimore County,
which had been conveyed to the appellee in 1903 without
restriction. Only three other lots had been sold out of this
tract during the 40 years in which the appellee had owned
it until the sale of a dwelling situated on part of the land
in question to Negroes in the early part of 1944 brought the
matter into court. In the three other sales referred to,
one deed contained no restrictions; the other two were
conveyed under restrictions similar to those contained in
the deeds to the appellant, although one contained a clause
providing that the restrictions were not to bind or apply
to any other property of the vendor except that "herein
described". The 74-acre tract had for many years been
bounded on the south by a group of houses belonging to
1 184 Md. 480, 41 A. 2d (1945).

